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Abstract 
 
This paper studies pension insecurity in a sample of non-retired individuals aged 50 years or 
older from 18 European countries. We relate pension insecurity with the subjective expectations 
on the probability that the government will reduce the pensions of the individual before 
retirement or will increase the statutory retirement age. We argue that changes in economic 
conditions and policy affect the formation of such probabilities, and through this, subjective 
wellbeing. In particular, we study the effects of pension insecurity on subjective wellbeing with 
pooled OLS models, regressions per quintiles and instrumental variables. We find a statistically 
significant, stable and negative association between pension insecurity and subjective wellbeing. 
The quintile regressions allow us to establish that pension insecurity is more salient for 
individuals who are poorer, who subjectively assess their life survival rate as low and who have 
higher cognitive abilities. 
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1. Introduction 
 There is a flourishing literature aimed at better understanding and measuring economic 
insecurity. The precise concept of economic insecurity has not been agreed upon, and policy 
discussions use different definitions and methods to measure it. The influential report on social 
progress by Stiglitz et al. (2009) defined economic insecurity as uncertainty about the material 
conditions that may prevail in the future, which may generate stress and anxiety. In a more 
general definition, Bossert and D’Ambrosio (2013: 1018) define economic insecurity as “the 
anxiety produced by the possible exposure to adverse economic events and by the anticipation 
of the difficulty to recover from them”. These authors look at the economic insecurity 
experienced at the individual level instead of any demographic group or country level as is usual 
in the policy debates. In this paper, we also look at individual insecurity, and focus our attention 
on a rather unexplored dimension: pension insecurity. We relate pension insecurity with the 
subjective expectations on the probability that the government will reduce the entitled pensions 
of the individual before retirement or will increase the statutory retirement age. 
 For this aim, we use data from waves 2 and 4 of the Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE), which comprises information for individuals aged 50 years or 
older from 18 European countries in 2007-2011. We specifically look at non-retired persons of 50 
years and older who are closer to retirement and, hence, face more constraints to adapt to pre-
retirement shocks than members of younger generations. The sample of non-retired individuals 
with no missing information amounts to 15,389. As the period of analysis includes the economic 
crisis of 2008 and the subsequent recession, our study also contributes to the understanding of 
the possible effects of the crisis on pension insecurity. Indeed, our paper is motivated by the 
graphs depicted in Figures 1a and 1b. These figures show a sharp difference in pension insecurity 
before and after the economic crisis. The distribution of the subjective probability that the 
government will adversely affect pension rights indicates higher pension insecurity in 2011 with 
respect to 2007.    
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 -Figure 1a and Figure 1b about here- 
 
The variation of pension insecurity during the period of analysis offers the opportunity 
to study the relationship between pension insecurity and subjective wellbeing. We argue that 
changes in economic conditions affect the formation of subjective probabilities about 
governmental pension regulations in the future, and through this channel, subjective wellbeing. 
It is expected that policies implemented after the economic crisis, such as budget cuts on social 
expenditures and reduction of safety nets, will also trigger the belief that the government will go 
further with its austerity measures and will reduce pensions and/or delay retirement. The 
uncertain future produces stress and anxiety, and therefore it can negatively affect subjective 
wellbeing. The study of wellbeing and pension insecurity is relevant in the case of the middle 
age population because the time to adjust to new pension regulations can be insufficient (through 
additional savings, for example) which may exacerbate the loss of wellbeing. A decrease in 
pensions can weaken the efforts to fight poverty in old age because pension income represents a 
large share of total old age income and significantly reduces poverty and income inequality 
(Marx et al., 2015). This view is also perceived by European citizens. Results from the opinion 
survey Eurobarometer (European Commission, 2012) report a large share (57%) of Europeans 
that are worried that their income in old age will be insufficient to live in dignity. This share has 
increased from 50% in July 2009 to 57% in December 2011 in the EU-27, and shows notable 
differences by country. For example, in Greece, Italy and Portugal, the concern about old age 
income has risen from 60%-62% to 75-80% between 2009 and 2011, while in Austria, Finland 
and Netherlands, this has increased from 28%-32% to 36%-37%. As another goal, this paper also 
attempts to improve the understanding of the effects of pension insecurity and allow policy 
makers to better recognise and understand the demand of pension policies in their countries and 
offer better policy responses. 
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 In this paper we study the relationship between pension insecurity and life satisfaction, 
which is a widely used measure of subjective wellbeing with well-established patterns (see e.g. 
Krueger and Schkade, 2008). Pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) models are employed for the 
total sample and for quintiles of relevant variables such as remaining time to reach retirement, 
income, life expectancy and cognitive abilities. We control for the usual demographics used in 
the empirical literature of life satisfaction and for country and year effects and their interactions. 
The measures of pension insecurity are the standardised subjective probabilities that the 
government will increase the retirement age or reduce pensions in the future, and the latent 
variable of both probabilities which is obtained from the first component of a principal 
component analysis (PCA). Our results indicate a statistically significant, stable and negative 
association between pension insecurity and life satisfaction. The quintile regressions allow us to 
establish that pension insecurity is more salient for the individuals that are poorer, that show a 
lower subjective life survival rate and have more cognitive abilities. Furthermore, we check that 
our results also hold for another measure of subjective wellbeing that is available in SHARE, 
which is a measure of eudemonic wellbeing related to quality of life (Hyde et al., 2003; Wiggins 
et al., 2004). Finally, as an additional conformation, we show that our results hold when we 
implement an instrumental variables (IV) approach including the country and time specific 
official retirement ages and fiscal macroeconomic conditions. This approach is useful to reduce 
problems of omitted variable bias, reverse causality and measurement error. The paper is 
organized as follows. The next section provides a background on subjective wellbeing and 
pension reforms in Europe. Section 3 presents the data and methods. Section 4 presents and 
discusses the results. Finally, section 5 provides a conclusion. 
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2. Background 
2.1. Pension reforms   
 In the course of the 2008 economic crisis, governments recorded a sharp increase of 
public budget deficits due to reduced tax revenues and increased spending on unemployed and 
inactive individuals (OECD, 2014). As a result, many European countries were under pressure 
to enact budget cuts on social expenditure and increased taxes or contributions to social systems. 
The sustainability of pension systems is challenged by demographic change and had been 
therefore under scrutiny even before the crisis. Increased life expectancy and lower fertility rates 
led to more pensioners, but fewer contributors. The upcoming retirement of the baby-boomer 
cohorts will aggravate this development. Additionally, past cohorts entered retirement under 
favourable conditions, which allowed them to exit the labour market quite early without high 
deductions.  
 The economic crisis accelerated the need to implement pension policy reforms as quickly 
as possible since pensions represent a large share of social security spending. In most European 
countries, austerity measures included the increase of early and normal retirement ages (see 
Table A1 of the Appendix). In other countries, reforms were already on the agenda and reform 
planning was accelerated (e.g., Germany and Netherlands). In several countries, early retirement 
schemes were abolished or suspended before or in the course of the crisis (Denmark, 
Netherlands, Poland, Ireland and Portugal). Furthermore, the pension model simulations from 
the OECD, which include the most recent changes in pension rules, indicated a deterioration of 
pension replacement rates in several countries (OECD, 2007; OECD, 2013). Figure 2 shows the 
magnitude of these changes between 2006 and 2012. For example, Greece is the country that has 
experienced the greatest fall in the pension replacement rate, with a decrease of about 30% during 
this time.    
 
-Figure 2 about here- 
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 Most of the pension measures have been introduced to maintain financial sustainability, 
but sometimes at loss of income adequacy in old age provisions (OECD, 2014). Among other 
European countries, especially in Eastern Europe, the third pillar was reinforced after the 
recession to overcome funding gaps in transitional systems like the Pay-As-You-Go system 
(Drahokoupil and Domonkos, 2012). The same applies for South European countries (Natali and 
Stamati, 2014). The reinforcement of the private second and third tier of pension systems is not 
necessarily fostering old age inequality. It is the mixture that is crucial for income adequacy in 
old age (Ebbinghaus and Neugschwender, 2011). However, persons at risk of old age poverty 
are those with a non-standard employment career, low-income households and women, as they 
might not be able accumulate resources and invest in private pensions or other ways of savings. 
Furthermore, while younger cohorts have more time to adapt to new pension systems and/or 
accumulate other types of savings, individuals that will retire in a foreseeable future are at risk 
to work longer and receive less generous retirement benefits.  
 
2.2.  Pension plans and subjective wellbeing 
Some studies show that retirement behaviour has changed after the economic crisis. For 
example, Szinovacz et al. (2014) look at pre- and post-crisis waves of the Health and Retirement 
Survey (HRS) and find that older workers expect to work longer regardless whether 
unemployment rates are higher or social security benefits are expected to drop. Hurd and 
Rohwedder (2011) also find that American older workers expect to postpone their retirement 
after the economic crisis. Similarly, Parker et al. (2013) report that expecting lower pension 
benefits is associated with plans to retire later instead of opting for early retirement. Interestingly, 
this last paper relates pension plan decisions to the level of individual cognitive abilities and 
finds that individuals with better cognitive abilities tend to retire later. Contrary to these studies, 
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Munnell and Rutledge (2013) show a more pessimistic description of retirement paths of 
Americans by pointing out that intentions to postpone retirement could not be fulfilled because 
of adverse conditions in the labour market for older workers. They report that more older workers 
were laid off in the 2008 economic crisis and subsequent Great Recession than in previous 
recessions, and they faced more difficulties in getting a new job. As a consequence, individuals 
speeded up their claiming of social security benefits and even disability benefits when the 
individuals experienced long spells of unemployment.   
In the case of Europe, the analysis of the SHARE dataset reveals that the economic crisis 
is associated with a lower likelihood of retirement of the European older workers (Meschi et al., 
2013) and a deterioration of their health (Bucher-Koenen and Mazzona, 2013). Furthermore, 
Meschi et al. (2013) find that the direct transition from unemployment to retirement has notably 
increased in the period 2008-2011 (post-crisis) compared with to the period 2004-2006 (pre-
crisis).  
Changes in pension regulations may have visible and strong effects in middle age 
workers. For example, considering the 2006 Dutch pension reform as a natural experiment and 
exploiting the exogenous variation of changes in pension rights for some cohorts, some studies 
present robust evidence for strong and negative effects of regulatory changes on job satisfaction 
and mental health (De Grip et al., 2012; Montizaan and Vendrik, 2014). In a sample drawn from 
the HRS, Falba et al. (2009) also find that those workers that had to deviate from their expected 
retirement plans report more depressive symptoms. Similarly, Clarke et al. (2012) have found 
that deviations from expected retirement plans have led to a decrease in life satisfaction of older 
American males.  
All these findings suggest that older workers have revised or are in the process of revising 
their plans concerning retirement. It seems clear that the economic crisis has prompted a 
reduction in the expected social security benefits by means of regulations aimed at reducing 
pension amounts and/or increasing the retirement age. It could also be the case that changes on 
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pension policies are not yet in place in some countries, but the individuals are anticipating the 
implementation of public policies that will cut old age expenditures. In any case, the evidence 
presented above is clear about the negative effects of changes in retirement plans on the 
wellbeing of older workers. In general, different forms of economic insecurity have a negative 
effect on subjective wellbeing. In this regard, job insecurity is a well-studied type of economic 
insecurity. It has been found that job insecurity leads to lower life satisfaction (Carr and Chung, 
2014; Silla et al., 2009), lower job satisfaction (Artz and Kaya, 2014; Lange, 2013), more mental 
health complaints (Hellgren and Sverke, 2003; Modrek et al., 2015; László et al. 2010) and more 
depression (Burgard et al., 2012; Meltzer et al., 2010). Coile et al. (2014) show that experiencing 
a recession in one’s 50s reduces longevity. Although there are studies that analyse the effects of 
changes in social security regulations, there is a lack of studies investigating pension insecurity 
and its effects on the wellbeing of older workers. By tackling this question, our study contributes 
to the literature of economic insecurity and subjective wellbeing.  
Regarding the effects of changes of macro variables on subjective wellbeing, Deaton 
(2012) has documented that life satisfaction in U.S. was closely related to the evolution of stock 
market indices during and after the economic crisis. This was particularly significant for 
individuals close to retirement and participating in funded pension systems because the crisis 
affected their expected old age income. Using the European Social Survey, Hershey et al. (2010) 
find that income inequality and a higher expected old age dependency ratio are associated with 
elevated worries about retirement income. Lübke & Erlinghagen (2014) show for 19 European 
countries that individual job insecurity is related to economic situation and country specific 
context, being particularly high in Ireland and Greece after the crisis. In Europe, macro 
fluctuations can also affect the confidence of the individuals in the future of their pensions. 
Figures 3a-3d show a high correlation between changes (before and after the crisis) in relevant 
macro outcomes and changes in perceptions about the confidence in the future of pensions in the 
country. For example, those countries where the decrease of the employment growth rate was 
8 
 
larger also experienced a larger increase in the variation of the share of individuals that reported 
being unconfident about the future of their pensions1.  
 
-Figure 3a-3d about here- 
 
 
3. Data and methods 
3.1. The data  
 We use the second and fourth wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in 
Europe2. This dataset is composed of representative surveys and comparable information for 
individuals aged 50 years or older in European countries and Israel. Our sample is composed of 
18 European countries: Austria, Germany, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and 
Switzerland. Wave 2 was collected in 2006/2007 and wave 4 in 2011/2012. The sample of 
observations with no missing data is formed by 15,389 individuals who are not yet retired and 
are 50 years of age or older.  
As we are interested in finding the predictors of life satisfaction, the dependent variable 
employed in our regression analyses is drawn from the question “On a scale from 0 to 10 where 
0 means completely dissatisfied and 10 means completely satisfied, how satisfied are you with 
your life?” Our variables for pension insecurity are obtained from the questions “What are the 
chances that before you retire the government will reduce the pension which you are entitled 
to?” and “What are the chances that before you retire the government will raise your retirement 
age?” In both questions, the individual must indicate a number between 0 and 100. Given that 
1 The figures about the confidence in pensions are drawn from the question which is asked only in the 
Eurobarometer rounds of 2006 and 2009: “At the moment, when you think of the future of your pension, would 
you say that you are...? very confident / somewhat confident / not very confident / not at all confident”. 
2 We use the releases 2.5.0 and 1.1.1 for waves 2 and 4, respectively. Detailed information about SHARE and its 
methodology can be found in: http://www.share-project.org/. 
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these two variables are closely related (correlation = 0.49) we perform a principal component 
analysis of both variables and predict the first component as a single latent factor. The first 
component explains 74.5% of the variance and the eigenvalues are 1.49 and 0.51. This variable, 
that we call pension insecurity, is then adjusted to range between 0 and 1.  
Other variables that will be used as controls are age, sex, married or living with partner, 
the number of chronic diseases3, years of education, labour status (working), house ownership 
and income. The income corresponds to the log of reported household income equivalised with 
the square root of the number of members in the household and adjusted by purchasing power 
parity and prices of the year 2011. House ownership is included as a proxy for wealth. Table 1  
reports the descriptive statistics of the assessed variables. 
 
-Table 1 about here- 
 
3.2. Empirical strategy 
We run OLS regression models with the pooled data of the two waves of SHARE which 
includes 18 countries surveyed in the period 2006-2012. The main specification is as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                           (1) 
 
The left-hand side variable 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 indicates individual life satisfaction. The subscripts i, c 
and t represent the individual, country and year, respectively. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is our variable of interest and 
measures pension insecurity as defined above. The set of variables included in 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are controls 
typically used in the empirical literature of life satisfaction. We include dummies of countries 
and years to control for effects that are country specific and general time trends. In addition, we 
3 A respondent is requested to list all applicable conditions in response to the question “Has a doctor ever told you 
that you had [Do you currently have] any of the conditions listed on this card?” 
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include interactions of country and time dummies to control for shocks that are country-year 
specific. All variables, except dummies, are previously standardised with mean equal to zero and 
standard deviation equal to one. Note that our results must be interpreted as associations instead 
of causality from pension insecurity to life satisfaction, although we will enrich our analysis by 
breaking down the model equations by quintiles of different and relevant variables. In this way, 
we are able to detect in what distinctive groups of people is life satisfaction more responsive to 
pension insecurity. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Main results 
The main results of the estimates for life satisfaction are shown in Table 2. The first 
column reports the estimates when pension insecurity is solely measured with the individual 
probability that the government will reduce pensions, while the second column reports the 
individual probability that the government will increase the retirement statutory age. The third 
column includes the latent variable of pension insecurity computed with those probabilities. As 
we noted before, there is a large correlation between both measures of pension insecurity, which 
can lead to large multicollinearity and inflate standard errors, and hence it is better to use a latent 
variable. 
 Recall that the units have been standardised so that these are expressed in standard 
deviations. In general, the covariates of each model show the usual associations with life 
satisfaction. Income is positively associated with life satisfaction. Approximately, the increase 
of one standard deviation (SD) in the log of incomes is associated with an increase of 0.06 SD 
in life satisfaction. Similarly, wealthier individuals –proxied by home ownership– show more 
satisfaction with life. One SD increase of age or educational attainment increases life satisfaction 
by 0.05 SD. By contrast, being affected by more chronic diseases is associated with less life 
satisfaction. There is a decrease of about 0.13 SD in life satisfaction for each SD increase in the 
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number of chronic diseases. Being employed shows a significant association with life 
satisfaction. Transiting from unemployment or an inactive labour condition to employment can 
increase life satisfaction by 0.27 SD. Being married or living with a partner notably increases 
life satisfaction by about 0.36 SD. Regarding the measures of pension insecurity, an increase of 
one SD in the chance that the government will reduce pensions is associated with a decrease of 
0.05 SD in life satisfaction. The effect of the chance that the government will increase the 
statutory retirement age on life satisfaction is 0.03 SD. Finally, an increase of one SD in the 
latent measure of pension insecurity is associated with a reduction of 0.06 SD in life satisfaction. 
The results of the full sample show that the relationship between pension insecurity and life 
satisfaction is negative and significant.  
 
-Table 2 about here- 
 
4.2. Results by quintiles 
In the following we will focus on the latent measure of pension insecurity. Generally, 
pension reforms are targeted to individuals who are not too close to retirement age in order to 
avoid a drastic reduction of pension rights and minimise social and political opposition. If this 
holds, then we can expect differential effects of pension insecurity on life satisfaction by how 
far the individual is from retirement age. As a consequence, individuals whose age is nearer to 
retirement age can feel more confident that they will not be affected by regulatory changes, while 
younger individuals may feel more worried. Depending on the institutional and economic 
conditions of the country, it is also plausible that the close-to-retirement individuals may 
experience insecurity and anxiety about their future pensions because they will not have enough 
time to adjust their savings to keep a desirable living standard in old age. This is particularly 
relevant in countries where retirement at legal age is compulsory, and labour beyond retirement 
is heavily taxed or not permitted. Furthermore, we can expect that younger individuals will be 
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less concerned with pension changes because either they have time to adjust their savings and 
labour decisions or they are myopic about the future. In any case, these conjectures can only be 
valued empirically, which we attempt to do with the model regressions presented in Table 3. 
Table 3 reports the life satisfaction estimates of equation models resulting from 
categorising the sample by quintiles of years to reach retirement age. Given that our sample 
includes individuals aged 50 or more and that retirement age is mostly fixed at around 65 years 
of age, the individuals have a time period before reaching retirement of about 0-15 years. Once 
the individuals are categorised into quintiles of these years4, we run the same main model 
regression for each quintile and report the results in Table 3. The first column corresponds to the 
individuals who are closer to retirement (average age is 60.7 years) while that the last column 
corresponds to the individuals for whom retirement will occur later (average age is 51.6 years). 
We observe that pension insecurity is statistically significant and negatively related to life 
satisfaction for every quintile except for the oldest quintile. Individuals of the third quintile are 
55.2 years old on average and show the biggest association between pension insecurity and life 
satisfaction: an increase of one SD in pension insecurity is associated with a reduction of 0.063 
SD in life satisfaction. As we postulated earlier, it is possible that the individuals who are very 
near to retirement are not affected by pension insecurity because the changes in pension 
regulations are not intended for them. Changes in age eligibility and replacement rates are in 
general aimed at workers that are not too close to statutory retirement ages. This is why we 
observe a larger effect of pension insecurity on life satisfaction among the younger individuals, 
with a peak for persons that will retire in a near future. 
 
-Table 3 about here- 
 
4 We have used the official retirement age in each country for every individual (figures can be consulted in the 
Appendix).  
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 Income, wealth or any other proxy of economic position can mitigate or exacerbate the 
effect of pension insecurity on life satisfaction. Because economic resources can protect 
individuals from unexpected pension regulatory changes and allow to smooth consumption in 
old age, we expect to find a lower effect of pension insecurity on life satisfaction for wealthier 
individuals. The model regressions presented in Table 4 correspond to samples of individuals 
categorised in income quintiles. In all groups, pension insecurity is negatively associated with 
life satisfaction, with the effect being the largest in the poorest quintile. An increase of one SD 
of pension insecurity in the poorest and richest quintile is associated with a reduction of 0.073 
SD and 0.03 SD in life satisfaction, respectively. Pension insecurity affects more the subjective 
wellbeing of the poor. Therefore, our results provide evidence for another vehicle of the negative 
effects of the 2008 economic crisis on subjective wellbeing outcomes, which complements a 
growing body of literature that looks at these effects but focuses on other outcomes. 
 
-Table 4 about here- 
 
It has been shown that the expectations about how long we will live play a role on 
decisions concerning retirement and saving and have a significant predictive power for mortality 
(Hurd and McGarry, 2002). In a recent paper with HRS data, Parker et al. (2013) report that 
those individuals expecting to live longer intend to retire later as well, which is consistent with 
the goal of trying to keep a desirable living standard during an extended length of life. In Europe, 
Peracchi and Perotti (2014) find that subjective survival probabilities are higher for individuals 
with more education, higher income and better health, which suggest that income and health are 
important in the formation of subjective survival evaluations. Our sample of individuals also 
answer a question intended to capture subjective life survival expectancy: “What are the chances 
that you will live to be age 75/80/85/90…?” Therefore, we are able to categorise individuals 
according to quintiles of subjective life survival. Respondents who are younger than 65 are asked 
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for their estimated chance of living up to a target age of 75, for those aged 65-69 this target age 
is 80, for those aged 70-74 this target age is 85 and so on. In order to take into account the 
differences on subjective longevity related with age, we divide the individual survival 
expectation by the official probability to live up to the corresponding target age from the Life 
Tables of Eurostat (which are age, sex, year and country specific). This means that the SHARE’s 
subjective survival expectation has been normalized to official life tables, which is similar to the 
procedure Parker et al. (2013) followed in their analyses of American data. After this adjustment, 
we compute quintiles of the subjective probability of survival and run regression models for each 
quintile. 
Table 5 shows the regression results per quintile of subjective survival. The lowest 
quintile includes the individuals whose beliefs about their survival rates are the smallest. On 
average, the individuals of this quintile consider their survival rate to be only 41% of the official 
survival rate, while that the individuals of the highest quintile believe that their survival rate is 
36% larger than their corresponding official survival rates. Pension insecurity is negatively 
related to life satisfaction and only significant in the first, third and fourth quintile. For the 
individuals in the lowest quintile, the effect of pension insecurity is considerable. An increase of 
one SD in pension insecurity is associated with a decrease of 0.09 SD in life satisfaction. Not 
surprisingly, the effect of the number of chronic diseases is the largest within this group: an 
increase of one SD in the number of health conditions is associated with a decrease of 0.17 SD 
in life satisfaction. As underestimated life expectancy may be closely related to poor health, as 
the results show that pension insecurity is more salient for the less healthy individuals.  
 
-Table 5 about here- 
 
Parker et al. (2013) highlight the importance and effects of cognitive abilities on sound 
decisions about retirement and savings. They find that individuals with better cognitive abilities 
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tend to retire later because they are able to better understand the negative financial consequences 
of early retirement on future living standards. Furthermore, less cognitively able individuals 
show more inconsistent retirement decisions, which calls for the need to assist with financial 
planning. Financial literacy is an increasingly important topic in the literature that attempts to 
explain poverty in general and old age poverty in particular (see e.g. Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008; 
van Rooij et al., 2012). Given that respondents of SHARE perform certain tests to measure 
cognitive functioning in old age, we are in a position to construct the distribution of cognitive 
abilities and categorise individuals in quintiles of cognitive abilities. We reduce the scores of 
immediate and delayed memory recall, verbal fluency and numeracy with a PCA and obtain the 
first component which will be our measure of cognitive abilities to construct quintiles 
(eigenvalues = 2.07 and 0.86, with the first component explaining 52% of variance)5. Table 6 
reports the differential effects of pension insecurity by quintile of cognitive ability. 
 
-Table 6 about here- 
 
 Pension insecurity is not statistically associated with life satisfaction for the two lowest 
quintiles of cognitive ability but it is a significant predictor for the other quintiles. In addition, 
the size of the negative association between pension insecurity and life satisfaction increases for 
each quintile. For example, one SD increase of pension insecurity is associated with a 0.08 SD 
decrease in life satisfaction for the individuals in the top 20% of the cognitive ability distribution, 
but this effect is not different from zero for those in the bottom 40%. This finding would suggest 
that the individuals with higher cognitive abilities are more aware of or more able to understand 
the consequences of changing pension rules on their future sources of old age income, and in this 
way experience a decline in subjective wellbeing. The underestimation of the effects of 
increasing pension insecurity in the group of less cognitively able individuals leaves life 
5 See Mazzonna and Peracchi (2012) for a detailed description of cognitive measures in SHARE. 
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satisfaction unaffected, but it is at least worrying that these individuals could be taking 
suboptimal decisions based on limited rationality. Bissonette and van Soest (2012) point out that 
overly optimistic beliefs may lead to under-saving in pensions. In the same way, our results for 
the less cognitively able individuals indicates that their decisions concerning retirement, 
pensions, savings and labour could be potentially misguided. 
   
4.3. Another measure of subjective wellbeing 
 In a recent paper, Steptoe et al. (2015) study the relationship between three different 
measures of subjective wellbeing, health and ageing in many different countries and regions. 
Subjective wellbeing is distinguished into hedonic wellbeing, which comprises an evaluative 
aspect or general assessment (life satisfaction) and positive or negative effects of experience 
(feelings of happiness, sadness, anger, stress, and pain) and eudemonic wellbeing, which 
measures overall quality of life (Diener, 1984). Steptoe et al. (2015) find important effects of all 
these measures on health. In previous sections we have focused on the evaluation measure of life 
satisfaction, but SHARE also includes a measure for eudemonic wellbeing which is the CASP-
12 (Control, Autonomy, Self-realization, Pleasure) (Hyde et al., 2003; Wiggins et al., 2004). 
Individuals must answer how often they experience 12 different feelings and situations on a 4-
point scale. The total score ranges from 12 to 48, and a higher score means a better level of 
subjective wellbeing. Not surprisingly, the correlation of CASP-12 with life satisfaction is high 
at 0.55. In the following, we will implement the same type of regression analysis we performed 
in the previous section but this time we replace the dependent variable of life satisfaction by the 
CASP-12 variable. Table 7 summarises the results of these regressions and only reports the 
coefficients for pension insecurity. 
 
-Table 7 about here- 
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 Each cell of Table 7 represents a different regression and only shows the coefficient of 
pension insecurity. The first column shows a significant and negative effect of pension insecurity 
on eudemonic wellbeing. One SD increase of pension insecurity is associated with a 0.09 SD 
decrease in the score of eudemonic wellbeing, which is even larger than the effect of life 
satisfaction reported above (i.e., 0.05 SD). Columns 2 to 6 show the effect of pension insecurity 
in each quintile of different variables. Different from the results on life satisfaction, we observe 
that the eudemonic wellbeing levels of individuals whose age is closer to retirement age are more 
affected by pension insecurity than those whose age is further from retirement. Similar to before, 
pension insecurity is more salient to explain a deterioration of eudemonic wellbeing in the group 
of poorer individuals than in the group wealthier individuals. In the case of subjective life 
survival rate, the effect of pension insecurity is stronger for the individuals who believe their 
subjective survival rate is the lowest. The results obtained for the quintiles of cognition do not 
show a consistent pattern between pension insecurity and eudemonic wellbeing. 
  
4.4. Instrumental variables 
In the introduction, we argued that changes in contextual economic variables will affect 
the formation of subjective probabilities about pension policies in the future, and through this, 
subjective wellbeing. Low levels of economic activity, high debt and the fall of fiscal revenues 
experienced during the years of the economic crisis and Great Recession have also been 
accompanied by policy changes aimed at reducing the generosity of future pensions. Clear 
examples of such policies are the increase of statutory early and normal retirement ages and the 
reduction of pension replacement rates. A way to explore this claim and to assess the internal 
validity of our results is provided through the use of an instrumental variable (IV) approach. The 
use of IV can help us to mitigate the problems of omitted variable bias, reverse causality and 
measurement error. For example, one can argue that some individuals who report low subjective 
wellbeing can also be more prone to express pessimistic views about the future and, hence, are 
18 
 
more likely to report a high probability that the government will reduce the generosity of their 
pensions. This could be a case of reverse causality where life satisfaction impacts pension 
insecurity or an omitted variable problem if no control for personality traits is available. 
However, the omitted variable bias is difficult to correct if no panel data is available6. 
Given the availability of certain administrative information that is exogenous to 
subjective wellbeing, we can perform IV regressions and explore the robustness of the effect of 
pension insecurity on subjective wellbeing. One of the instruments will be a variable equal to the 
statutory retirement age of the country minus the age of the individual. The statutory ages 
correspond to the years 2007 and 2012 (see Table A1 in the Appendix) assessed in SHARE and 
are country and sex specific. Therefore, we rely on these variations as a valid instrument for 
pension insecurity. We expect that the individuals whose age is more distant from the official 
retirement age will feel more pension insecurity. The reason is that this variable is a proxy for a 
situation in which the statutory age has increased thus extending the length of time to work before 
retirement. Another IV is the government net lending position over GDP which indicates the 
amount of financial assets available for lending (if positive) or borrowing (if negative) to finance 
the government expenditures that are in excess of revenues. A high deficit will indicate problems 
with the sustainability of public finances. This variable was extracted from the OECD and is 
country and year specific. We expect that pension insecurity is negatively correlated with net 
lending position.    
Next, Table 8 shows the results of the IV regressions for life satisfaction and the 
eudemonic wellbeing measure as well. The results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test at the bottom 
of Table 8 indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis that pension insecurity is exogenous. 
Therefore, the IV estimates can be rated as more efficient than the OLS estimates. The F-statistic 
is considerably larger than the rule of thumb of 10 (Stock et al., 2002) and confirms the strength 
6 Although the SHARE dataset is longitudinal, the variables related to pension insecurity are not measured in 
more than one wave, and hence we cannot use panel data methods. 
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of our instruments. The over-identification test assess if the instruments are invalid instruments 
and whether the structural equation is incorrectly specified. In both sets of dependent variables, 
the results of the Sargan and Barman tests (although the last one is not reported) are statistically 
not significant and, therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are valid. 
In addition, in the first stage, we find the expected results of the instruments on pension 
insecurity: i) the variable retirement age minus age is positively correlated with pension 
insecurity, and ii) a deterioration of public finances is correlated with an increase of pension 
insecurity. Importantly, the effect of pension insecurity on subjective wellbeing is significant 
and negative. This effect is -0.187 SD and -0.162 SD for the life satisfaction and the eudemonic 
wellbeing measure, respectively. 
 
-Table 8 about here- 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
 The indicator of pension insecurity explored in this paper draws on the concept of 
economic insecurity recently developed in the economic literature, which is aimed at measuring 
and understanding the effects of volatile economic environments such as the 2008 economic 
crisis. Pension insecurity is a form of economic insecurity that produces anxiety among older 
workers because the time to adjust to new pension policies can be insufficient. In particular, we 
investigate how pension insecurity is connected to subjective wellbeing in a European 
population. We claim that pension insecurity is decreasing the life satisfaction of individuals 
who are facing near-term retirement. We argue that this is even more pronounced under 
unfavourable economic conditions. Indeed, opinion survey data show that worries about 
pensions have increased after the economic crisis. Our results are in line with current research 
focussed on studying the effects of the economic crisis and the Great Recession on retirement 
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expectations and retirement behaviour. Furthermore, we are interested in understanding which 
factors moderate pension insecurity and life satisfaction of older Europeans. Our findings reveal 
that persons who are more affected by pension insecurity are those individuals who are further 
away from their retirement, have lower income, subjectively assess their life survival as low and 
have higher cognitive abilities. Furthermore, these results also hold with a second subjective 
wellbeing indicator that measures quality of life, the CASP-12. We address the lack of a panel 
data structure and problems of reverse causality, measurement error and omitted variable bias 
with IV regressions that enrich the previous results. The IV estimations allow us to exploit the 
external variation of pension regulations and public finance conditions per country and year, and 
through this channel we can claim that pension insecurity is influencing wellbeing and not the 
other way around. These results are robust for both wellbeing indicators. 
 We conclude that pension insecurity is another form of economic insecurity, which 
depends on the individual variation of resources as well as on economic conditions and 
eventually on the abilities of governments to balance these. This is salient for younger seniors 
today due to the recent crisis and its aftermaths, but it will be even more important for the 
retirement of coming cohorts. What was known for decades suddenly became an emergency 
situation in the course of the crisis. Funding of pension systems will be an issue for the near 
future, and they are under revision in many European countries. However, with the rise of private 
pension systems, provisions could be increasingly depend on market forces which could 
reinforce pension insecurity in the long run and reflect socioeconomic inequalities in the society. 
Therefore, it is necessary to improve the understanding of the effects of pension insecurity thus 
allowing policy makers to better recognise and understand the demand of pension policies in 
their countries and offer better policy responses. 
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Disclaimer 
 This paper uses data from SHARE wave 4 release 1.1.1, as of March 28th 2013 and 
SHARE wave 1 and 2 release 2.6.0, as of November 29th 2013. The SHARE data collection has 
been primarily funded by the European Commission through the 5th Framework Programme 
(project QLK6-CT-2001-00360 in the thematic programme Quality of Life), through the 6th 
Framework Programme (projects SHARE-I3, RII-CT-2006-062193, COMPARE, CIT5- CT-
2005-028857, and SHARELIFE, CIT4-CT-2006-028812) and through the 7th Framework 
Programme (SHARE-PREP, N° 211909, SHARE-LEAP, N° 227822 and SHARE M4, N° 
261982). Additional funding from the U.S. National Institute on Aging (U01 AG09740-13S2, 
P01 AG005842, P01 AG08291, P30 AG12815, R21 AG025169, Y1-AG-4553-01, IAG BSR06-
11 and OGHA 04-064) and the German Ministry of Education and Research as well as from 
various national sources is gratefully acknowledged (see www.share-project.org for a full list of 
funding institutions). 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A1 
Country 
females  males 
2007   2012   2007   2012 
normal 
ret. 
early 
ret.   
normal 
ret. 
early 
ret.   
normal 
ret. 
early 
ret.   
normal 
ret. 
early 
ret. 
Austria 60.0 60.0   60.0 60.0   65.0 62.0   65.0 62.0 
Germany 65.0 63.0   65.1 63.0   65.0 63.0   65.1 63.0 
Sweden 65.0 61.0   65.0 61.0   65.0 61.0   65.0 61.0 
Netherlands 65.0 65.0   65.0 65.0   65.0 65.0   65.0 65.0 
Spain 65.0 61.0   65.0 63.0   65.0 61.0   65.0 63.0 
Italy 60.0 57.0   62.0 62.0   65.0 60.0   66.0 62.0 
France 60.0 57.0   65.0 60.0   60.0 57.0   65.0 60.0 
Denmark 65.0 60.0   65.0 60.0   65.0 60.0   65.0 60.0 
Greece 60.0 55.0   63.5 62.0   65.0 55.0   65.0 62.0 
Switzerland 64.0 62.0   64.0 62.0   65.0 63.0   65.0 63.0 
Belgium 65.0 60.0   65.0 60.0   65.0 60.0   65.0 60.0 
Czech Rep. 61.0 58.0   61.0 60.0   63.0 60.0   63.0 60.0 
Poland 60.0 60.0   60.0 60.0   65.0 65.0   65.0 65.0 
Ireland 65.0 65.0   66.0 66.0   65.0 65.0   66.0 66.0 
Hungary 62.0 57.0   63.5 59.0   62.0 60.0   63.5 60.0 
Portugal 65.0 55.0   65.0 55.0   65.0 55.0   65.0 55.0 
Slovenia 61.0 58.0   61.0 58.0   63.0 58.0   63.0 58.0 
Estonia 60.5 57.5   61.0 58.0   63.0 60.0   63.0 60.0 
Source: OECD (2007), OECD (2011), OECD (2013), OECD (2014). European Commission (2009). 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Descriptives 
variable mean SD min max 
life satisfaction 7.821 1.583 0.000 10.000 
chance of pension reduction 0.472 0.352 0.000 1.000 
chance of retirement age increase 0.489 0.372 0.000 1.000 
pension insecurity 0.480 0.312 0.000 1.000 
male 0.495 0.500 0.000 1.000 
married or living with partner 0.808 0.394 0.000 1.000 
working 0.883 0.322 0.000 1.000 
years of education 12.060 4.193 0.000 25.000 
age 56.229 4.320 50.000 75.000 
chronic diseases 1.109 1.198 0.000 8.000 
log of equivalised income 3.080 1.120 -7.537 8.652 
home ownership 0.770 0.421 0.000 1.000 
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Table 2. OLS estimates of life satisfaction 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
        
male 0.0036 0.0029 0.0043 
  (0.0262) (0.0265) (0.0264) 
married or living with partner 0.3571*** 0.3572*** 0.3566*** 
  (0.0253) (0.0254) (0.0253) 
working 0.2737*** 0.2719*** 0.2734*** 
  (0.0465) (0.0467) (0.0465) 
years of education 0.0505*** 0.0492*** 0.0500*** 
  (0.0161) (0.0158) (0.0160) 
age 0.0472*** 0.0530*** 0.0443*** 
  (0.0095) (0.0102) (0.0106) 
chronic diseases -0.1293*** -0.1304*** -0.1296*** 
  (0.0151) (0.0152) (0.0152) 
log of equivalised income 0.0638*** 0.0645*** 0.0641*** 
  (0.0131) (0.0132) (0.0131) 
home ownership 0.1432*** 0.1422*** 0.1425*** 
  (0.0284) (0.0284) (0.0282) 
chance of pension reduction -0.0551***     
  (0.0142)     
chance of retirement age increase   -0.0256**   
    (0.0114)   
pension insecurity     -0.0497*** 
      (0.0119) 
constant -0.7735*** -0.7852*** -0.7837*** 
  (0.0464) (0.0471) (0.0463) 
N 15,389 15,389 15,389 
R2 0.174 0.172 0.173 
All specifications include year and country dummies and their interactions. Pension insecurity is the first 
component of a PCA of both chances of pension changes in the future. All variables, except dummies, are 
standardised with mean zero and SD equal to one. Robust clustered (by country) errors are in parentheses, 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Table 3. OLS estimates of life satisfaction per years to reach retirement quintiles 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
closest  to 
retirement 2nd 3rd 4th 
furthest 
from 
retirement 
            
male 0.0175 -0.0598 0.0350 0.0200 0.0147 
  (0.0250) (0.0553) (0.0377) (0.0462) (0.0538) 
married or living with partner 0.3197*** 0.4124*** 0.3869*** 0.3358*** 0.3895*** 
  (0.0337) (0.0595) (0.0390) (0.0460) (0.0356) 
working 0.2052** 0.2793*** 0.2246*** 0.4832***   
  (0.0846) (0.0863) (0.0577) (0.0820)   
years of education 0.0328 0.0647** 0.0212 0.0872*** 0.0429** 
  (0.0261) (0.0260) (0.0262) (0.0211) (0.0188) 
age 0.0736 0.0652 0.0572 -0.0758 0.0950 
  (0.0607) (0.0626) (0.0536) (0.0638) (0.0621) 
chronic diseases -0.1447*** -0.1432*** -0.1488*** -0.1150*** -0.1008*** 
  (0.0256) (0.0184) (0.0253) (0.0202) (0.0230) 
log of equivalised income 0.0478 0.0581** 0.0546* 0.0733*** 0.0873** 
  (0.0375) (0.0238) (0.0267) (0.0154) (0.0352) 
home ownership 0.1450** 0.1928*** 0.0965** 0.0953 0.2242*** 
  (0.0574) (0.0448) (0.0431) (0.0613) (0.0625) 
pension insecurity -0.0219 -0.0600** -0.0627*** -0.0491* -0.0404** 
  (0.0183) (0.0228) (0.0181) (0.0250) (0.0179) 
constant -0.8015*** -0.4231*** -0.6813*** -0.5503*** -1.6180*** 
  (0.0818) (0.0727) (0.0473) (0.1213) (0.0975) 
N 2,937 2,970 2,937 2,864 2,902 
R2 0.191 0.197 0.190 0.180 0.195 
All specifications include year and country dummies and their interactions. Pension insecurity is the first 
component of a PCA of both chances of pension changes in the future. All variables, except dummies, are 
standardised with mean zero and SD equal to one. Robust clustered (by country) errors are in parentheses, * 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 4. OLS estimates of life satisfaction per income quintiles 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
poorest 
quintile 2nd 3rd 4th 
richest 
quintile 
            
male 0.0309 0.0366 -0.0275 0.0197 0.0173 
  (0.0593) (0.0343) (0.0277) (0.0380) (0.0310) 
married or living with partner 0.3837*** 0.2647*** 0.2626*** 0.3472*** 0.3407*** 
  (0.1057) (0.0398) (0.0393) (0.0496) (0.0409) 
working 0.4172*** 0.1769** 0.2317*** 0.0674 0.1966*** 
  (0.0492) (0.0641) (0.0779) (0.0606) (0.0616) 
years of education 0.0968*** 0.0042 0.0063 0.0102 0.0492** 
  (0.0259) (0.0187) (0.0234) (0.0286) (0.0197) 
age 0.0531* 0.0586*** 0.0709*** 0.0181 0.0024 
  (0.0265) (0.0189) (0.0226) (0.0197) (0.0184) 
chronic diseases -0.1403*** -0.1636*** -0.1049*** -0.0887*** -0.1139*** 
  (0.0200) (0.0282) (0.0161) (0.0232) (0.0277) 
log of equivalised income 0.0607* 0.4359*** 0.4734* 0.2766** -0.0195 
  (0.0324) (0.1377) (0.2294) (0.1123) (0.0180) 
home ownership 0.1364** 0.1557*** 0.0886* 0.1298*** 0.1338*** 
  (0.0498) (0.0444) (0.0485) (0.0296) (0.0318) 
pension insecurity -0.0729* -0.0480** -0.0558** -0.0283 -0.0298* 
  (0.0357) (0.0190) (0.0217) (0.0219) (0.0144) 
constant -0.2937** -0.7881*** -0.0887 -0.8327*** -1.0535*** 
  (0.1250) (0.1093) (0.0697) (0.0482) (0.0738) 
N 3,079 3,079 3,082 3,081 3,068 
R2 0.122 0.132 0.124 0.136 0.183 
All specifications include year and country dummies and their interactions. Pension insecurity is the first 
component of a PCA of both chances of pension changes in the future. All variables, except dummies, are 
standardised with mean zero and SD equal to one. Robust clustered (by country) errors are in parentheses, * 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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 Table 5. OLS estimates of life satisfaction per subjective life survival quintiles 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
lowest 
quintile 2nd 3rd 4th 
highest 
quintile 
            
male -0.0606* 0.0326 -0.0756* -0.1448*** -0.0402 
  (0.0330) (0.0289) (0.0363) (0.0325) (0.0384) 
married or living with partner 0.3141*** 0.3685*** 0.4182*** 0.3069*** 0.3765*** 
  (0.0490) (0.0378) (0.0355) (0.0396) (0.0541) 
working 0.2900*** 0.3394*** 0.2864*** 0.0525 0.2736*** 
  (0.0771) (0.0581) (0.0866) (0.0729) (0.0806) 
years of education 0.0841** 0.0431* 0.0368* 0.0512** 0.0204 
  (0.0323) (0.0208) (0.0182) (0.0199) (0.0239) 
age 0.0545** 0.0382* 0.0365 0.0427** 0.0379** 
  (0.0196) (0.0201) (0.0223) (0.0169) (0.0179) 
chronic diseases -0.1654*** -0.0757*** -0.0922*** -0.0916*** -0.0657*** 
  (0.0208) (0.0185) (0.0220) (0.0225) (0.0202) 
log of equivalised income 0.1093*** 0.0029 0.0772** 0.0409** 0.0616** 
  (0.0272) (0.0142) (0.0328) (0.0180) (0.0251) 
home ownership 0.1731*** 0.1310*** 0.1099** 0.1134*** 0.1338*** 
  (0.0522) (0.0395) (0.0485) (0.0341) (0.0412) 
pension insecurity -0.0852** -0.0208 -0.0401* -0.0604*** -0.0150 
  (0.0334) (0.0215) (0.0222) (0.0173) (0.0151) 
constant -1.6462*** -1.0470*** -0.0937 -0.1445** -0.1728* 
  (0.0651) (0.0539) (0.0912) (0.0609) (0.0895) 
N 3,079 3,079 3,079 3081 3,071 
R2 0.182 0.146 0.204 0.148 0.183 
All specifications include year and country dummies and their interactions. Pension insecurity is the first 
component of a PCA of both chances of pension changes in the future. All variables, except dummies, are 
standardised with mean zero and SD equal to one. Robust clustered (by country) errors are in parentheses, * 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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 Table 6. OLS estimates of life satisfaction per cognitive score quintiles 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
lowest 
quintile 2nd 3rd 4th 
highest 
quintile 
            
male 0.1028* 0.0036 -0.0114 0.0218 -0.0263 
  (0.0554) (0.0479) (0.0370) (0.0359) (0.0257) 
married or living with partner 0.3552*** 0.3304*** 0.3466*** 0.3579*** 0.3672*** 
  (0.0646) (0.0452) (0.0388) (0.0364) (0.0699) 
working 0.3402*** 0.2898*** 0.1819** 0.1863** 0.1832** 
  (0.0764) (0.0720) (0.0739) (0.0827) (0.0800) 
years of education 0.0184 0.0431 0.0163 0.0544*** 0.0205 
  (0.0246) (0.0255) (0.0194) (0.0180) (0.0226) 
age 0.0392 0.0755** 0.0761*** 0.0482** 0.0011 
  (0.0246) (0.0271) (0.0193) (0.0175) (0.0132) 
chronic diseases -0.1518*** -0.1365*** -0.1079*** -0.0904*** -0.1218*** 
  (0.0230) (0.0172) (0.0194) (0.0189) (0.0273) 
log of equivalised income 0.1086*** 0.0436* 0.0479** 0.0432** 0.0483** 
  (0.0246) (0.0223) (0.0197) (0.0176) (0.0178) 
home ownership 0.1988*** 0.1214** 0.1689*** 0.0863* 0.1176* 
  (0.0422) (0.0441) (0.0453) (0.0439) (0.0613) 
pension insecurity -0.0313 -0.0197 -0.0565*** -0.0601** -0.0787*** 
  (0.0245) (0.0291) (0.0158) (0.0211) (0.0205) 
constant -0.5701*** -1.4929*** -2.2795*** 0.1414 -0.3895*** 
  (0.0762) (0.0749) (0.0480) (0.0832) (0.0806) 
N 3,086 3,070 3,076 3,077 3,077 
R2 0.178 0.171 0.167 0.178 0.195 
All specifications include year and country dummies and their interactions. Pension insecurity is the first 
component of a PCA of both chances of pension changes in the future. All variables, except dummies, are 
standardised with mean zero and SD equal to one. Robust clustered (by country) errors are in parentheses, * 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 7. Pension insecurity estimates of eudemonic wellbeing (CASP-12) 
Variable for the 
quintile 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
total 1st quintile 2nd quintile 3rd quintile 4th quintile 5th quintile 
              
total -0.0865***      
  (0.0108)      
years to reach 
retirement  -0.1055*** -0.1066*** -0.0708*** -0.0848*** -0.0642*** 
   (0.0244) (0.0204) (0.0165) (0.0275) (0.0161) 
income  -0.0886*** -0.0899** -0.1000*** -0.0957*** -0.0451*** 
   (0.0209) (0.0373) (0.0192) (0.0137) (0.0126) 
subjective life survival  -0.1005*** -0.0573*** -0.0733*** -0.1036*** -0.0717*** 
   (0.0346) (0.0140) (0.0135) (0.0164) (0.0176) 
cognitive score  -0.0969*** -0.0718*** -0.0662*** -0.0939*** -0.0995*** 
   (0.0258) (0.0222) (0.0192) (0.0136) (0.0219) 
Each cell represents a different regression of eudemonic wellbeing (CASP-12) and contains the coefficient of 
pension insecurity and its robust clustered (by country) standard error.  All specifications include year and country 
dummies and their interactions. Pension insecurity is the first component of a PCA of both chances of pension 
changes in the future. All variables, except dummies, are standardised with mean zero and SD equal to one. * 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Table 8. Instrumental variables of subjective wellbeing 
Variables 
(1) (2)   (3) (4) 
1st stage 2nd stage   1st stage 2nd stage 
pension 
insecurity 
life 
satisfaction   
pension 
insecurity 
eudemonic 
wellbeing 
            
pension insecurity   -0.1875***     -0.1623*** 
    (0.0253)     (0.0214) 
male -0.0434 0.0118   -0.0434 -0.0061 
  (0.0265) (0.0236)   (0.0265) (0.0228) 
married or living with partner -0.0258 0.3556***   -0.0258 0.1339*** 
  (0.0217) (0.0247)   (0.0217) (0.0206) 
working 0.0454* 0.2699***   0.0454* 0.3121*** 
  (0.0221) (0.0440)   (0.0221) (0.0445) 
years of education 0.0230* 0.0549***   0.0230* 0.0705*** 
  (0.0124) (0.0157)   (0.0124) (0.0202) 
chronic diseases 0.0222** -0.1278***   0.0222** -0.1846*** 
  (0.0095) (0.0155)   (0.0095) (0.0145) 
log of equivalised income -0.0070 0.0643***   -0.0070 0.0610*** 
  (0.0084) (0.0123)   (0.0084) (0.0129) 
home ownership -0.0046 0.1379***   -0.0046 0.1642*** 
  (0.0205) (0.0262)   (0.0205) (0.0254) 
Instruments:           
normal retirement minus age 0.0765***     0.0765***   
  (0.0055)     (0.0055)   
government net lending -0.0982***     -0.0982***   
  (0.0272)     (0.0272)   
           
F-test: pension insecurity 99.295     95.603   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 27.300  (p = 0.0001)   5.6444  (p = 0.0295) 
Partial R2 0.221     0.222   
Over-identification test (Sargan) 0.535  (p = 0.464)   1.47726  (p = 0.2242) 
constant -0.7054*** -0.3320***   -0.7054*** -0.1443** 
  (0.1760) (0.1011)   (0.1760) (0.0642) 
N 15,389 15,389   15,389 15,124 
R2 0.221 0.153   0.221 0.199 
Year and country dummies are included. Pension insecurity is the first component of a PCA of both chances 
of pension changes in the future. All variables, except dummies, are standardised with mean zero and SD equal 
to one. Robust clustered (by country) errors are in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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 Figure 1a. Predicted probability that the government 
will increase the retirement age in the future 
Figure 1b. Predicted probability that the government 
will reduce pensions in the future 
  
Source: SHARE’s waves 2 and 4.  
Note: The figures represent Kernel distributions (bw=0.1) of predicted probabilities for respondents surveyed in waves 2 and 4 of SHARE. 
The predicted values are estimated with pooled OLS regressions that control by age, sex, years of education and dummies of countries, years 
and their interactions.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Net pension replacement rates 
 
 Sources: OECD (2007) and OECD (2013). 
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 Figure 3a. Unconfident about the future of pensions and 
GDP growth rate (variation 2006-2009) 
Figure 3b. Unconfident about the future of pensions and 
employment growth rate (variation 2006-2009) 
  
 
Figure 3c. Unconfident about the future of pensions and 
public debt to GDP ratio (variation 2006-2009) 
 
Figure 3d. Unconfident about the future of pensions and 
long-term interest rate on gov. bond (variation 2006-2009) 
  
 
Source: Eurobarometer 66.3 and 71.3 for subjective variables and Eurostat for the macro variables.  
Note: The y-axis reports the difference in the percentage of individuals (50+ and non-retired) that has no confidence (not very confident or 
not at all confident) about the future of their pensions between 2006 and 2009 for each country. The question used from the Eurobarometer 
is: “At the moment, when you think of the future of your pension, would you say that you are...? very confident / somewhat confident / not 
very confident / not at all confident”. The x-axis reports the percentage differences in the macro variables between 2006 and 2009 for each 
country. 
 
 
 
 
AT
BEBG
CY
CZ
DK
EE
FI
FR
DE
GRHU
IE
IT
LV
LT
LU
MT
NL
PL
PTRO SK
SI
ES
SE
GB
-1
0
0
10
20
30
no
t c
on
fid
en
t a
bo
ut
 p
en
si
on
s 
(v
ar
. 2
00
9-
20
06
)
-25 -20 -15 -10 -5
GDP growth rate (var. 2009-2006)
Correl=-0.548
AT
BEBG
CY
CZ
DK
EE
FI
FR
DE
GRHU
IE
IT
LV
LT
LU
MT
NL
PL
PTROSK
SI
ES
SE
GB
-2
0
0
20
40
no
t c
on
fid
en
t a
bo
ut
 p
en
si
on
s 
(v
ar
. 2
00
9-
20
06
)
-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5
employment growth rate (var. 2009-2006)
Correl=-0.723
AT
BEBG
CY
CZ
DK
FI
FR
DE
GRHU
IE
IT
LV
LT
LU
MT
NL
PL
PTROSK
SI
ES
SE
GB
-1
0
0
10
20
30
no
t c
on
fid
en
t a
bo
ut
 p
en
si
on
s 
(v
ar
. 2
00
9-
20
06
)
-10 0 10 20 30 40
public debt to GDP ratio (var. 2009-2006)
Correl=0.613
AT
BE BG
CY
CZ
DK
FI
FR
DE
GR HU
IE
I
LV
LT
LU
MT
NL
PL
PT ROSK
SI
ES
SE
GB
-1
0
0
10
20
30
40
no
t c
on
fid
en
t a
bo
ut
 p
en
si
on
s 
(v
ar
. 2
00
9-
20
06
)
0 5 10
long-term interest rate on gov. bonds (var. 2009-2006)
Correl=0.699
36 
 
